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Article 8

HOLMES AND CARL SCHMITT: AN UNLIKELY
PAIR?*
David Dyzenhaust
Holmes's case suggests... that the positivistic attitude may often
represent the emotional resolution of a conflict between the opposing
forces of romanticism and skepticism at war in the same breast.
Romanticism demands a "fighting faith," the possibility of which
skepticism denies. From the emotional impasse which thus results a
positivistic philosophy may furnish the only possible escape. It offers
the faith which romanticism demands and to which it may make
conspicuous sacrifice. Since this faith is avowedly artificial,
adherence to it involves no compromise of skeptical scruple.'
INTRODUCTION

Holmes was deeply interested in German philosophical
and legal thought. In his major theoretical work, The Common
Law,2 he devoted a great deal of space to a discussion of
trends in German philosophical and legal scholarship, in particular to the leading practitioners of German legal science of
the late nineteenth century. While this was his only sustained
attempt to grapple in print with German thought, his interest
in things German persisted throughout his life, as the most
cursory glance at his correspondence reveals.

"1997 David Dyzenhaus. All Rights Reserved.
Associate Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto. I thank
Cheryl Misak and Michael Taggart for comments on a draft of this article and,
especially, John Goldberg both for his comments at the Holmes conference and for
letting me see a draft of his contribution to this volume. In the latter, Goldberg
provides a most charitable and insightful critique of my arguments in earlier work
as well as in this article. His criticism of my earlier work is well taken. My
response to his critique of this article is for the moment the much too perfunctory
one offered in note 67 below.
I LON L. FULLER THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITsELF 107 (1966).
2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLliES, JR., THE COMiON LAw (1881).
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Nevertheless, it is not easy to assess the influence of German legal scholarship on Holmes, particularly because in The
Common Law Holmes portrayed the German work on which he
focused as fundamentally misguided, engaged in the futile task
of trying to make sense of the law as a logical conceptual system. This task was futile because the "life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."3 Holmes thought that the
common law was close to the experience of mankind. He thus
contrasted the common law with the abstractions of German
legal science and with continental attempts to rationalize
whole systems of law by codification. In The Common Law, he
went so far as to argue that German legal science was wrong
simply because its answers to complex legal questions were at
odds with the answers embedded in the common law.
Whatever else changed in Holmes's own understanding of
the law, the idea that law is not logic but experience retained
its hold. In The Path of the Law,4 Holmes's last elaborate
statement of his legal theory, logic (or rational argument) is
presented as playing a more or less cosmetic role in the life of
the law: it pertains to the way in which judges get from their
assumptions to their conclusions, and what ultimately matters
are the assumptions.5
Hence, it seems as though Holmes, in one sense, was not
influenced by German legal scholarship; he engaged with it
only to find it deficient. Indeed, he might well have engaged
with it in order to find it deficient. Mathias Reimann has argued that German legal science was a stalking-horse for the
true target of The Path of the Law-the formalism which
Holmes found exemplified by Cristopher Columbus Langdell.'
However, even if Holmes's engagement with German legal
science in The Common Law is one designed to set it up for a
fall, thus discrediting by direct inference, some homegrown
legal theories, it would be implausible to suppose this motive
from the first. As is often pointed out, Holmes's initial hopes
for legal reform bore more resemblance to Langdellian formalId. at 1.
' Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
[hereinafter Holmes, Path].
3

5 Id. at 465-66.
6

Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes's Common Law and German Legal Science, in

THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HoL ES, JR. 72 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).

19971

HOLMES AND CARL SCH3MTT

ism than he cared to admit. Furthermore, Holmes had to teach
himself German, and plough through a massive amount of
German philosophy and legal theory before he could exploit his
knowledge. He did so because of his hope that German legal
science would assist him in putting the muddle of the common
law in order. In particular, he hoped that the influence of
Fredrich Carl Von Savigny's historical school within German
legal science would show how the experiential basis of the law,
its evolutionary development in response to social and political
pressures, could be reconciled with putting the law in order.7
So Holmes went to German legal science with hopes of
finding a basis for rendering the law more suited as a resource
for order and stability. Once these hopes were dashed, he exploited German legal science in the manner Mathias Reimann
sketches.
The issue of the influence of German legal scholarship on
Holmes is thus a complex one. Since he officially dismissed it
as unworthy of influencing the development of common law
legal orders, it is not surprising that Holmes's influence on
German legal scholarship has been virtually nonexistent. Indeed, even if he had been more friendly to German legal science-possibly finding within it a useful tool for analyzing the
common law-I doubt that things would have been different.

This is because Holmes was the quintessential common
law lawyer, opposed to the core of his being to grand theoretical systems. The pragmatism of common law is generally so
alien to German legal thought that any theory built on its back
seems like no theory at all. Even now, when interest in Germany in Anglo-American legal thought is at a peak, it is the systemic features of that thought which are taken seriously, to
the almost entire neglect of its common law roots.8 Holmes is,9
of course, known in Germany for his wonderful aphorisms,
but his noteworthy contribution is perceived to lie in his judgments as a Justice on the Supreme Court.a

7I.
at 79-80, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W.
Gordon ed., 1992).
8 For an example, see the treatment of Ronald Dworkin, Lon L. Fuller, and
H.LA Hart in JORGEN HABERIAS, BETVEEN FACTS Arm NoRiS: COrTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
9

See, e.g., ROBERT ALExY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECETS 33 (1992).

.0 See, for example, Gustav Radbruch's review of a biography of Holmes in
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Nevertheless, there is a way to explore what I take to be
my brief-the relationship between Holmes's legal thought and
German legal theory-which goes beyond an evaluation of
Holmes's reaction to German legal science. I hope to show that
Holmes's journey from The Common Law to The Path of the
Law has interesting affinities with what may at first seem to
be a very different intellectual journey-that of Carl Schmitt,
the German public lawyer and political philosopher. Since
Schmitt is best known outside of Germany for his enthusiastic
support for the Nazis after 1933, and for his failed attempt to
reconfigure his legal theory to advance his career as the Nazi
legal philosopher, Holmes and Schmitt seem an unlikely pair.
But a comparison of Holmes's intellectual journey to Schmitt's
journey from mainstream legal theorist in 1911 to praise-singer of Nazi lawlessness after 1933 reveals much. In particular,
it reveals, or so I will argue, that their legal theories had a
common basis in a Hobbesian positivism stripped of any normative foundation.11
I. HOLMES, LEGAL POSITIVISM, AND THE COMMON LAW
Holmes has been considered an important figure in the
various philosophical traditions prominent during his own
intellectual development and throughout his career on the
bench. He has been called Darwinian or social evolutionist,
libertarian or free market liberal, democratic, legal positivist,
utilitarian, pragmatist, and conservative verging on Hobbesian
authoritarian. In this section, I support those who have argued
that Holmes's greatest and continuing theoretical debt was
owed to John Austin's legal positivism."2 Indeed, I argue that

SODDEuTScHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 24 (1946).
" Understanding Holmes through the lens of such associations is not a novel
approach. See, e.g., Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 669
(1945) and Ben W. Palmer, The Totalitarianism of Mr Justice Holmes 37 A.B.A. J.
809 (1951). See also Yosal Rogat, Mr Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15
STAN. L. REV. 3 & 254 (1962-63) (challenging Holmes's reputation as a civil libertarian judge).
12 See, for example, the perceptive essay on Holmes in RICHARD A. COSGROVE,
OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1930,
at 95, 110-27 (1987). Cosgrove lists the main sources for and against this view id.
at 110 n.67. See also William P. LaPiana, Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver
Wendell Holmes's Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 809 (1990); Saul
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Holmes's real debt is to Hobbes through the medium of Austin,
but that his version of legal positivism is more crude than that
of either Hobbes or Austin.
Austin is most remembered for this sentence in his Lectures on Jurisprudence:"The existence of law is one thing; its
merit or demerit is another."1 Here, he states what has come
to be known as the "separation thesis" of legal positivism: the
thesis that there is no necessary connection between law and
the requirements of sound morality. H.LA. Hart, who coined
the term, noted that the separation thesis is the central idea in
a history that goes from Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, through his disciple Austin, to Holmes's The Path of
the Law. 4 For just as The Common Law is best remembered
for the assertion that experience and not logic is the life of the
law, so The Path of the Law is remembered for the "bad man."
It is remembered for the claim that the law is best understood
from the perspective of the man whose only motive for obedience to the law is his wish to avoid the sanctions visited by
"public force" on disobedience.'
Holmes claims that the nature of law is what makes it
possible to understand law from the "bad man's" perspective.
Law is a matter of hard social facts, not of controversial moral
argument: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,6
and nothing more pretentious are what I mean by the law."'
This is an analytical claim about the nature of law, one which
Holmes tries to defend by showing how it best makes sense of
actual legal problems, in the main by avoiding confusions
which attend views that conflate law and morality.17

Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory 10
HOFSTRA L. REv. 673 (1982).
3

1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 214 (London, John Murray

1885).
"' See H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 55-56 (1983). Some 18 years earlier,
Fuller organized his critique of positivism on the basis of a history of the same
central idea. See FULLER, supra note 1. Here I draw on my HARD CASES IN
WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILoSoPHY 228-36 (1991) and David Dyzenhaus, Why Positivism is Authoritarian, 37 AM.
J. JURIS. 83, 93-101 (1992).
15 Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 459-60.
16 Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 461.
' Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 461-64.
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Holmes then moves to the topic of the "forces which determine [law's] content."" It is in this section of the essay that
he declares that logic is merely form and that the real stuff of
the law, its motive force in development, is a "judgment as to
the relative importance of competing legislative demands."19
He argues that an awareness of the social and political forces
which shape these demands is the only sound basis for both
judging judges and getting them to judge better. Furthermore,
he suggests that the best available resources for adjudicating
between legislative demands are statistics and economics. The
only use for the history of the law is to reveal to us irrationality that assists progress through an "enlightened scepticism."
History can teach us that laws are irrational survivors, either
because they were introduced for a bad reason or because the
reason for their introduction has long since ceased to be compelling.0
Here Holmes seems to be making some kind of moral or
normative claim. Although he maintains a commitment to
skepticism about morality, he holds out the hope of enlightened scepticism, of progress a necessary condition of which is
the adoption of the analytically defended separation thesis.
The separation thesis tells us that if we want to understand
law, we must understand that law is law in virtue of particular
social facts. For Holmes, these are the facts that make it possible to predict judicial decisions about the application of public
force. And in seeing that law is just in virtue of social facts,
and not in virtue of some inherent moral basis for a claim to
legitimacy, we are enabled to adopt the attitude of enlightened
skepticism.
In making a normative claim on behalf of the separation
thesis, Holmes situates himself even more firmly within the
tradition of legal positivism-a tradition in which the analytical and normative claims for the separation thesis always
travel together. The tradition is a complex one, and many
different ways have been suggested to aid in sorting out its
different adherents. In my view, there are two (intimately
related) issues which distinguish one positivist position from

10

Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 464.

*' Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 466.
20

Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 469.
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another: first, how the position connects its analytical and
normative parts; second, on what legal institution the position
focuses-executive, legislature, or judiciary. Indeed, in the
history of positivism the normative generally had priority over
the analytical, and the way in which it was given priority in a
particular position led to that position's focus on one or another legal institution.2 I emphasize this fact because the recent
history of positivism has been dominated by the attempt, initiated by H.LA. Hart, to found positivism on a purely analytical
basis; and the widespread acceptance of Harts initiative has, I
think, obscured our understanding of the positivist tradition.
For example, Hobbes's legal positivism-his analytical
account of what law is-is presented as the solution to the
normative problem of the state of nature as he understood
it.' That problem arises because Hobbes thought that each
individual has the right to determine what is right; however,
each individual will have different views about what is right.
The state of nature is hence a chaos of competing claims as to
what is right. To solve this problem and achieve order and
stability, we must delegate our right to determine what is
right to an absolute sovereign, whose commands we are morally obliged to obey. Positive law is the means for communicating
the sovereign's commands to his subjects. As a result, Hobbes
is opposed to the common law tradition, both because of the
general indeterminacy of the common law and because it gives
judges power which should be reserved for the sovereign.
Hobbes's analytical claim about law is thus secondary to
the normative part of his theory. His reason for being a legal
positivist is a normative one; law, conceived positivistically, is
necessary to help solve the problem of the state of nature.
Since that problem can only be solved if there is an absolute
sovereign power-one unfettered by law-the key legal institution is the executive.

"1Here I follow the lead of Fuller in LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF, supra note 1, and of Gerald Postema in GERALD POsTEmtA, BETHAM AND
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986), which is not to say that either would accept
the detail of my sketch of the positivist tradition.
2
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1986) (1651).
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Bentham also deploys legal positivism in the service of a
wider, though very different, political or normative agenda. He
wants law that lives up to the positivist distinction between
law as it is and law as it ought to be. However, positive law is
not supposed to preempt the resort of individuals to their own
views of right and wrong, as suggested by Hobbes. Hobbes's
skepticism about reason, which makes him a subjectivist, is
matched by Bentham's generally optimistic confidence in the
rational ability of individual reasoners.'
Bentham thought that law enacted by legislators should be
certain in the sense of being factually determinable by publicly
accessible tests. Rather, positive law facilitates the deliberation
of right individual reason, which Bentham takes to be reasoning on the basis of utility. Because positive law is certain and
predictable, it provides a secure basis upon which an individual can calculate the utility of doing this rather than that. Further, positive law provides the basis onto which general expectations can fasten. Citizens must consider in their calculation
the pain of suffering a sanction in the event that they decide to
disobey the law. They must also consider reasons for following
the law, which will include both its intrinsic merits and the
weight appropriately accorded to the fact that others will expect their compliance. But citizens are not under any moral
obligation to obey the law merely because it is a law. The only
moral obligation for the individual is to act in accordance with
utility, which might require disobedience to law. (Although
what law requires and what people expect on the basis of law
must figure in the utilitarian calculation.)
Similarly, even when the law is clear, judges must calculate whether utility requires that they apply it. This apparent
license of discretion granted to judges is not a problem for
Bentham's mature view, since he ultimately argued that judicial decisions should not have legal force beyond the decision
between the parties. His mature view does not try to make
common law adjudication something close to Hobbes's model of

" I rely here on JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES (James

H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1977) (1774-76) and JEREMY
BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (James H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
The Athlone Press 1977) (1776), as well as Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code,
in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JERE Y BENTHAM (James H. Burns et al. eds.,

1983).
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law as the commands of an uncommanded commander.
Bentham decided such a task was impossible. Instead, he advocated eliminating "judge-made law" altogether.
In Bentham's ideal society, judges would adjudicate in the
shadow of a code, enacted by enlightened legislators. Legislative enlightenment would be ensured by a system of comprehensive democratic controls, such as a free press, frequent
elections, and a right of recall over incompetent legislators. In
cases of indeterminacy of law or when judges found that the
law caused injustice in a particular case, judges should decide
the matter in accordance with utility. Yet this decision would
have no legal effect except as between the parties, and the
matter would then be referred to the legislature for proper
consideration. In sum, Bentham puts the analytical in the service of the normative. And, since his fundamental normative
demand is for democracy, the legislature is the institution
upon which his legal theory focuses.
Austin also gave priority to the normative over the analyt4 Austin
ical. In the third of his Lectures on Jurisprudence,"
outlines a theory of authority which leads to a picture of a
political society based on utilitarian principles very different
from Bentham's. Austin does not argue for Bentham's radical
democracy in which each individual is the ultimate arbiter of
what should be done. His political and legal theory is much
more akin to those rule-utilitarian philosophies which suppose
that consequentialist justifications for moral truths might have
to be concealed from the public. Austin puts forward a version
of what Bernard Williams and Amartya Sen aptly describe as
"Government House utilitarianism": "An outlook favouring
social arrangements under which a utilitarian elite controls a
society in which the majority may not itself share [the beliefs
of the elite].'

Austin is not a Hobbesian subjectivist. He holds that correct answers to even the deepest questions about morality are
given by appropriate utilitarian calculation. But he lacks confidence in the "multitude" of his society; they are too ignorant to
24 I am greatly indebted for insight into this issue to R. B. Friedman, An Introduction to Mill's Theory of Authority, in MILL: A COLLECrION OF CRmcAL EsSAYS 379-425 (J.B. Schneewind ed., 1968).
,Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianismand Beyond, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 16 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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be trusted with the business of making such calculations. Austin regards the multitude of his day in much the same light as
colonial officials regarded the native inhabitants of the territories they governed: he describes the multitude as given to
"coarse and sordid pleasures," people with a "stupid indifference about knowledge.""
To the extent that the multitude of his day is unenlightened, and are doomed to remain so, they can legitimately be
subjected to the dominion of authority. By "authority" Austin
means exactly what Hobbes meant-a system of commands
which subjects must take as conclusive as to what to do on
pain of suffering a sanction if they do not follow the command."
Austin's emphasis on coercion as part of the very definition of command indicates that he sees the need for a nonrational mark of authority-one that compels the obedience of
the multitude regardless of their view on the merits of the
content of the command. Austin also recognizes that the obedience of the multitude will be extracted not by their conviction
about the merits of obeying this or that command or system of
commands, but by the fact that there will be a system of positive laws which they know they must obey on pain of coercion.'
Most important of all is Austin's debt to Hobbes. Throughout Austin's lectures, he emphasizes his respect for Hobbes,
saying that he knows "of no other writer (excepting our great
contemporary Jeremy Bentham) who has uttered so many
truths, at once new and important, concerning the necessary
structure of supreme political government, and the larger of
the necessary distinctions implied by positive law."" Austin's

26 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 134.
27 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 88-91.
28 See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 299.
29 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 281. In fact, Benthdm gets only four more refer-

ences in the index to Lectures on Jurisprudence than does Hobbes and several of
the former are critical while Austin generally praises Hobbes. In addition, Austin
opens his lectures by adopting Hobbes's definition of law. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13,
at 3. He adopts Hobbes's conception of sovereignty over Bentham's because

Bentham, Austin claims, forgot to notice that the supreme commander must himself be completely uncommanded.

1 AUSTIN, supra note 13,

at 234-35. Like

Hobbes, Austin argues that there can be no legal limitation on sovereignty, whereas Bentham thought such a limitation undesirable but not conceptually impossible.
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only objections to Hobbes are first that Austin supposes that
there is no absolute duty to obey the commands of the sovereign. Second, he rejects Hobbes's reliance on a fiction of an
original contract whereby individuals can be taken to have consented to the status quo because of a supposed preference for
order over chaos.
But Austin also seems to argue for a doctrine of consent
based on the preference for order over chaos. The difference
between Austin and Hobbes is, as Austin puts it, the doctrine
of consent is "bottomed" directly on the "principle of utility,"
rather than on Hobbes's state of nature. What drives his utilitarianism is the "uncertainty, scantiness, and imperfection of
positive moral rules." For Austin, the habit of obedience of the
multitude comes about either through recognition of the "utility of political government, or a preference by the bulk of the
community, of any government to anarchy."3
In addition, while Austin allows for the possibility of a
general right of disobedience, as well as a right of disobedience
to particular laws when utility requires it, he emphasizes the
dangers involved in such a calculation-to the extent that it
hardly ever seems appropriate. 32 Thus, his first objection to
Hobbes is of little force. Indeed, the considerations Hobbes
raises against a right of resistance are almost identical3
Austin tries to save Hobbes from the charge of being an
"apologist for tyranny" by pointing out that unless one makes
the mistake of confusing tyranny with monarchy, the charge is
one of supporting bad rule. Austin says that he and Hobbes
agree that the principal cause of tyranny is the ignorance of
the multitude of "sound political science."' When it comes to
telling us what is sound, Austin asserts that when the multitude is in a state of instruction, the form of government is a
matter of indifference; however, when the multitude is in a
state of ignorance, the form of government "is of the highest
importance." Austin clearly means that an absolute monarchy
is to be preferred to an ignorant representative government. =

"
"

1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 294-95.
1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 294-95.
1 AUSTIN, supra haote 13, at 118-20.
See, eg., HOBBES, supra note 22, at ch. 18.
1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 281 (emphasis omitted).
1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 282-83.
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Because there was a system of representative government in
existence in Austin's day, his solution to absolute monarchy is
the next best thing: it is rule by an elite over a partly enfranchised electorate with limited control over government."
Hence, Austin, with Hobbes, puts forward a doctrine of
political responsibility to law which Fuller once aptly described
as a "one-way projection of authority"-a doctrine which regards legal subjects as appropriately obedient to the direction
and manipulation of rulers." But Austin is forced to cope
with representative government. This gives rise to his attempt
to provide a conception of appropriate political authority, and
of law which serves that conception, which will justify rule by
an elite over a partly enfranchised electorate.
My claim that Austin establishes an authoritarian conception of law may seem at odds with his account of the judicial
role. Austin argues, against Bentham and Hobbes, that it is
appropriate for judges to act as legislators. In fact, he says, the
problem is not that judges have the power to legislate, but that
they have not exercised it radically enough to correct unclear
or improper statutes." This claim goes, of course, totally
against the grain of Bentham's work: it gives to judges a power
which Bentham at one time was determined to limit and which
later he decided had to be altogether eradicated.
However, it is important to notice that when Austin discusses the virtues of legislation, whether emanating from the
legislature or the judiciary, he is assuming that legislators or
judges or both are instructed in the science of utility. If the
assumption holds true for judges but not legislators, the possibility is left open of enlightened judges correcting the statutes
of unenlightened legislators-legislators in the grip of the
coarse passions of the mob. Thus, Austin expresses an aspiration to reform the common law into a more rational, that is
positivistic, system of law; one that is worthy of acting as a
basis for legal authority.

"6For Austin's hostility to anything more democratic, see JOHN AUSTIN, A
PLEA FOR THE CONSTrrUTION (London, John Murray, 2d ed., 1885).
31 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrIY OF LAW 204 (1969).
31 1 AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 218; 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECUTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 532-33, 641-47 (London, John Murray 1885).
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In sum, Austin, like Bentham, put the positivist conception of law to work in the service of a normative, utilitarian
theory. But because his theory is closer politically to Hobbes
than to Bentham, the basic tendency of his legal theory is
authoritarian. He differs from Hobbes mainly in his willingness to give power to the judiciary, because he places more
trust in the judicial elite of his day than he does in legislators.
Indeed, he regards the capture of the center of political decision-making by an ignorant electorate as an unfortunate fact of
political life. While Hobbes advocates a radical centralization
of political power in the person of the sovereign, Austin wants
some checks on the center because he fears that it will not
make the best decisions, as judged by the standards of utility.
Before I place Holmes within this tradition, I will underline Austin's reasons for turning, against the grain of legal
positivism, from legislators and the executive, to judges. Austin
could make this move because he believed that utility provided
standards external to law for evaluating the moral soundness
of the law. The move was, that is, dictated by moral considerations. In contrast, for Hobbes the law is necessarily morally
sound-at least this is the perspective citizens must adopt in
deciding how to act-even if in their hearts they disagree with
the sovereign's understanding of what is right."
At the time of writing The Common Law, Holmes subscribed more or less to all the basic tenets of the Austinian
creed outlined above. This included Holmes's faith that judges,
acting on the basis of a rationalized common law, purged of a
misleading moral or natural rights vocabulary, could, in Morton Horwitz's words, avoid the "extreme implications both of
potentially anarchic individualism and of the threat of tyrannical state power."40 However, this purge was not to take place
in accordance with the standards of utility, but was to happen
by bringing the common law closer to customary standards.
Holmes did not suppose that the law ought to be reformed in
the light of morality, but rather brought into accordance with
" The same reasons dictate Austin's rejection of Hobbes's foundation for the
obligation to obey the law. For Hobbes, citizens are under an obligation to obey
the law because of their contract with the sovereign. But for Austin, that obligation is justified only by utility.
' Morton Horwitz, The Place of Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLIES, JR., 31, 49 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992).
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what held out the most promise for stability and certainty, the
customary basis of the common law. Custom is, for Holmes,
equivalent to objectivity.
As Horwitz has convincingly argued, by the time Holmes
came to write The Path of the Law, custom could no longer
plausibly be held out as a basis for reforming the common
law.4 ' The common law had begun to reflect political battles
about the redistributive role of the state, and the best solution
was to bring these battles to the surface.
It is not, I think, that Holmes had totally despaired of the
role of custom in law. In The Path of the Law, he still expresses some romantic hopes for the law as the "witness and the
external deposit of our moral life." "Its history," he says, "is the
history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it,
in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good
men."42 But those hopes, as well as the hope that enlightened
judges might correct irrationalities in the law, could only last
as long as the "race" could see itself as a relatively homogeneous entity, with the values that made it homogeneous
sedimented in the law. Once social and political conflicts become radical, the legal expressions of "moral" homogeneity are
themselves called into question.
Holmes eventually came to the view, most famously exemplified in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 4 that one must
adopt an institutional solution to the chaos of political and
legal indeterminacy. He believed that judges should defer to
the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. This is
not because Holmes is a democrat by conviction. Rather, it is
because, in the absence of any principled way of settling the
political and social conflicts that enter into the province of the
judiciary, security and stability are best served by taking the
people's will as moral. 44
41
41
4'

id.
Holmes, Path, supra note 4, at 459.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).

4 See, for example, the discussion in G.

EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER

WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 324-28 (1993). John Goldberg suggests that there are other plausible reasons for adopting the legislature as the
institutional solution. I agree, and Bentham's democratic commitments provide a
clear example here. But the reasons advanced in the text for Holmes's adoption of
the legislature seem to make the most sense given what we know about Holmes's
attitude towards democracy.
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This doctrine of strict deference may not seem at first to
fit well with the central role Holmes gave to judges in The
Path of the Law. But it must be the case that figuring prominently among the hard social facts which make judicial pronouncements about the law predictable is the dominant judicial ideology about such matters as deference to the legislature. Moreover, the range of such ideologies is limited by the
criterion of predictability. To take an obvious example: Ronald
Dworkin's recent call to American judges to adopt a "moral
reading" of the Constitution would be a priori ruled out because it requires that judges rely on unpredictable judgments
about morality.4 5
Only hard facts will do-facts about custom or the people's
will. In times of political conflict and social instability, facts
about custom are, by definition, no longer available. Facts
about the people's will are therefore a promising candidate;
these are facts which have won out in the political struggle,
their victory marked by their promulgation into legislation.
Like other figures in the positivist tradition, Holmes therefore puts his analytical theory to work in the service of a normative, though not properly moral, theory. Law is whatever
will deliver certainty and stability. But on this account,
Holmes's legal theory does not so much fit into the positivist
tradition as it represents a kind of return to its founder, Thomas Hobbes-with some necessary adaptations made for a more
complex political world in which the legitimacy of the people's
will is taken as a given.
But these adaptations make Holmes's normative project
even more parsimonious than Hobbes's. Any sensitive reader of
Hobbes's Leviathan knows that he never quite succeeded in
constructing an entirely absolutist solution to the problem of
the state of nature. The rights of each individual in that state
persist in various ways into the state of civil society, so that
Hobbes never advanced an absolutely unconditional obligation
of obedience to the sovereign. In other words, what distinguishes Holmes from his positivist predecessors, including Hobbes,
is that for him the realm of the normative is exhausted by the
values of order and stability.

4See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTTUTION (1996).
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II. CARL SCHMIT ON LAW

Carl Schmitt's first scholarly work, Gesetz und Urteil (Law
and Judgment), appeared in 1911,46 some years before the
crisis following Germany's defeat in the First World War-a
crisis which both gave birth to the Weimar Republic and kept
a fatal grip on its progeny. While there is no sense within
Gesetz und Urteil of the political and social problems already
brewing in Germany, it is a response
to a crisis of legal or4"
indeterminacy.
of
crisis
der-the
Before embarking on an exposition of the themes of Gesetz
und Urteil, it is worth noting the obvious. When Schmitt
thinks of the law he is not thinking of the common law, but of
statute or Gesetz. He is concerned only with the problem of
judges applying laws in a statute book. Nevertheless, because
of the way Schmitt conceives that problem, his focus, like
Holmes's, becomes one of finding an objective basis for adjudication.
Schmitt identifies liberal legal thought with those movements within German legal science which sought to establish a
rational basis for adjudication. These movements attempted to
find a rational conceptual structure inherent in the law which
would make it possible for judges to be transmitters of a content already contained in the law. Schmitt believes that such
attempts not only failed, but were doomed to fail. No matter
how clearly legislators try to state the content of the legal
norms they legislate, there is hardly ever a clear cut case of
law application by a judge that does not require a moment of
creative interpretation.48
Schmitt emphasizes that the moment of indeterminacy
arises as a matter of jurisprudence; the correct understanding
of law tells us that indeterminacy arises because the law requires application, and application requires interpretation.
This point is made as part of a critique of Bentham for having

16CARL ScHMITT, GESETZ UND URTEIL: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM PROBLEM DER
RECHTSPRAXIS [CARL SCHMITT, LAW AND JUDGMENT] (1969) [hereinafter SCHMITr,
GESETE].
' I am greatly indebted in this section to William E. Scheuerman, Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal Thought: The Case of Carl Schmitt, in 18
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (forthcoming 1997).
SCHMIT,

GESETZ, supra note 46, at 67.
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allowed his social and political agenda to drive his theory of
adjudication to the point where he advocated eliminating all
judicial interpretation of the law.
Bentham, in Schmit's view, rightly sees that judicial interpretation is creative. But because such creativity is at odds
with his desire to make the law predictable in the cause of
stabilizing individual expectations, Bentham requires an impossible degree of determinacy of statutory law, a degree which
would obviate the need for judicial interpretation.49
However, in Gesetz und Urteil Schmitt wants some basis
for adjudication that can put it, and the law in general, on an
objective basis. He rejects the recommendations of the Free
Law School, which offered the closest approximation to a common law candidate for providing an objective legal basis for
adjudication." The founders of the School, however, while
continuing to emphasize the need for judicial discretion, still
advocated legal standards to work as constraints on discretion-standards extrapolated directly from the relevant statutes or customary law and more general legal principles. For
Schmitt, such standards and principles cannot constrain anything, for they are, by nature, inherently vague. 1
In short, for Schmitt the problem of indeterminacy arises
within the law but cannot be solved by the law. Determinacy
cannot be achieved solely by the law binding the judge and so
one must look outside of the law. Schmitt's own suggestion
asks us to shift our focus from the law to the judicial community-more specifically, to the empirical social relations between
judges. His criterion for an objective or correct ("richtige")
decision is the following: "A judge's decision can today be taken
for correct when we can predict that another judge would have
decided the matter in exactly the same way. 'Another judge'
means here the empirical type of the modern, legally learned
jurist." 2 The law here comes to be little more than one of the
, ScHIrrr, GESETZ, supra note 46, at 63.
See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 359-60
(1992). The Free Law School played an important role at the turn of the century
in discrediting the claims of rationalist legal science. It did so largely by pointing
out obvious cases of indeterminacy in law, and then showing how legal science,
because of its commitment to determinacy through conceptual analysis, offered
absurd resolutions of such cases.
SCHBrr, GESETZ, supra note 46, at 40-42.
GESETZ, supra note 46, at 71. 'Eine richterliche Entscheidung ist
52 SCHMr,
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main means by which a judge justifies his decision; insofar as
one judge can predict that another will rely on the law in a
particular way, he should himself rely on the law. Reliance on
the law becomes just one practice among the others which
together make up3 the array of practices constitutive of the
legal community.

William Scheuerman, addressing Schmitt's "solution" to
the problem of indeterminacy, states that,
[alt least implicitly, Schmitt... presupposes a significant degree of
political, social, and doctrinal homogeneity within the German judiciary; from Schmitt's perspective, the relative unanimity of socially
conservative and deeply anti-democratic views among German jurists in 1912 certainly must have provided some empirical plausibili-

ty to this assumption."4

Scheuerman's view is accurate in that Schmitt's solution does
not make sense except in terms of this presupposition of homogeneity. However, he underestimates the extent to which
Schmitt wants the solution to be something distinctively legal.55 Correctness in law is, Schmitt says, a matter of practice-practice which justifies itself. But that, he claims, does
not make correctness a matter of predicting what the "average
judge" would decide. Rather, it is a matter of what is correct by
dint of methodological observation: "The answer is the product
of the postulate of legal determinacy together with the fact
that there exists today a body of learned professional judges."56 Highly professional judges are, that is, engaged in a distinctively legal enterprise because they orient themselves primarily around the legal value of together achieving legal deter-

minacy.
Thus, while Schmitt's solution to the problem of indeterminacy is one that comes from outside the law, in the sense of
positive statute law or Gesetz, it is still, in his view, a legal
solution. This explains why in his next work on legal theory,

heute dann richtig, wenn anzunehmen ist, daB ein anderer Richter, ebenso
entschiedenhdtte. Ein anderer Richter' bedeutet hier den empirischen Typus des
modernen rechtsgelehrten Juristen."
SCMnTr, GESETZ, supra note 46, at 86-87.

Scheuerman, supra note 47, at 18.
Although Scheuerman adverts to this possibility in footnote 26 of his manuscript. See Scheuerman, supra note 47.
56 SCHAIrT, GESETZ, supra note 46, at 86.
"
"
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Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeuting des Einzelnen (The
Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual),"7 he
hints at establishing a theory of law akin to Hans
Kelsen's-law is a normative order which allocates norm-making power rather than one which determines the content of
norms. 58

In these two works, Schmitt presents a view of law that is
almost identical to the view presented by Holmes in The Path
of the Law. The problem of how to resolve legal indeterminacy
is solved by an appeal to facts about judicial power because we
cannot expect law itself to offer a solution. But neither Schmitt
nor Holmes appeal to mere power; they want law to make an
impact on the decisions as to what law is. Hence they preserve,
even if obscurely, some hope for the law figuring in the prediction of how judges will decide cases.
Holmes, as I have said, never gave up on this hope for the
future of law but was eventually forced to diminish it to a
doctrine of judicial deference to the people's will, whatever its
content. Schmitt, by contrast, lost nearly all hope for the law
as the Weimar Republic, having survived the first crisis of civil
disintegration that led to its founding, succumbed during the
late 1920s and early 1930s when Germany became a battleground for increasingly bellicose heterogeneous factions.
It is important, though, to understand that Schmitt was
not a passive spectator to the disintegration and destruction of
Weimar. While Schmitt is not altogether unambiguous in his
views about Weimar in the early 1920s, his publications at a

time when Weimar was becoming increasingly stable begin to
express a deep hostility to liberal democracy. Schmitt worked
to construct a legal and political theory based on a quasi-theo-

logical idea focusing on the importance of the exceptional case
in grasping the substance of a normal order. It is in the exceptional moment-in law the. state of emergency-that the truth
emerges with what is true being what wins out in a battle

between self-defined friends and enemies. Only a vision founded on an idea of the substantive homogeneity of the Volk can

- CARL ScHmEr, DER WERT DES STAATES UND DIE BEDEUTMIG DES EINzELEN
[CARL ScHmIT', THE VALUE OF THE STATE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL] (1914).
" See Scheuerman, supra note 47, at 19-25.
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lay the basis to shift from a state of political chaos to that of
stability and certainty. Liberal democracy becomes the enemy
for Schmitt. It tries to design a rational legal order which deides the exceptional character of politics while simultaneously,
through its doctrine of neutrality, making the state vulnerable
to capture by its internal enemies. He thus advocates
refounding German political and legal order on an illiberal basis, whatever that turns out to be.59
Schmitt claims that this basis must be democratic, since it
is a kind of "sociological" fact about the twentieth century that
any political solution be one which is in the name of the people. In his view, there are no moral standards apart from what
people happen to believe in particular places. The conclusion
he draws is that liberalism is anti-democratic since it seeks to
impose its moral standards on particular nations. A dictatorship in the name of the people is, however, in the spirit of
democracy, as long as the dictator can attract acclaim from the
bulk of the people, whose role in democracy is limited to saying
"yes" or "no."6
Schmitt's theory not only drew on influential strands within German conservative thought, but also made a distinctive
contribution to them in providing a legal theory to justify the
authoritarian trends in politics in the early 1930s. Indeed,
Schmitt was the main legal adviser to General Schleicher, the
chief mover in Germany's drift to the right. Once the Nazis
won power, it was no surprise that Schmitt enthusiastically
joined them despite his earlier disdain for their plebeian roots.
Schmitt was compelled by his own logic to celebrate the Nazi
victory in 1933 since he believed that truth is constituted by
the victory of an anti-liberal vision. 6

" See, for example, the following works by Carl Schmitt: CARL SCHmrIT, POLITFOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George
Schwab trans., MIT Press 1988) (1934); THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George
ICAL THEOLOGY:

Schwab trans., Rutgers University Press 1976) (1932); THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMdENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 2d ed. 1988) (1926).
See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CARL SCHMrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY] (Dunker & Humblot 1989) (1928).
1 For a brief account, see David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of
Weimar: Contemporary Lessons? 1997 Am. POL. SC. REV. 91, 121-34. For a more
elaborate discussion, see DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL
SCHm=IT, HANS KELSEN, AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) [hereinafter
DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY & LEGITIMACY]
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William Scheuerman argues that the seeds of Schmitts
thought, as it developed from the early 1920s through the Nazi
period, are already contained in Gesetz und Urteil. The seeds
lie in the two major elements of that work. the idea that discretion or unconstrained choice is the result of indeterminacy
in the law, and the idea that the stabilizing basis for filling the
gap of discretion is homogeneity.'
IfIf one moves quickly from these two elements to Schmitt's
infamous celebration of Nazi legality in 1933, Staat,Bewegung,
Volk (State, Movement, People),' one can see how the discretionary moment in the law, which occupies Schmitt in 1911,
has by 1933 become for him a metaphor for the entire legal
order of a liberal democratic state. The law of liberal democracy is nothing more than the space of discretion, with different
interest groups competing to capture that space. One can also
see how homogeneity, the solution to the problem of unstructured political space, changes in both quality and scope. It
changes in scope because Schmitt no longer finds judicial homogeneity to be an adequate solution; one also needs the homogeneity of the people in whose name the central lawmaking
body speaks. It changes in quality because that homogeneity is
now explicitly conceived as ethnic or racial.
I suggest that Holmes was able to maintain some semblance of hope for law only because, whatever the changes in
and disruptions to the political and social context in which he
worked, it never seemed that things were out of control. Never
did it seem that the only hope for certainty and stability lay in
a revolution that would bring about a new political and social
order, one capable of stabilization through law. But his basic
attitude to the law was one which could be mapped in all important respects onto Schmitt's, and in the circumstances of
late Weimar, that logic has as its conclusion, Staat, Bewegung,
Volk.6

Scheuerman, supra note 47, at 23-24.

CARL SCHId1Tr, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, YOLK [CARL SCHuHT, STATE, MOVEMEN"T,
PEOPLE] (1933). For the slower, fully argued version, see Scheuerman, supra note
47.
During the conference where this paper was first presented, Judge Richard
Posner said of Holmes's conception of law, one with which he seemed to agree,

that the task of law is to keep danger at bay. This conception is precisely
Schmitt's. As Perry Anderson has pointed out, Schmitt's later work is haunted by
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The root of this logic lies in the way in which both Holmes
and Schmitt detach Hobbesian legal positivism from its normative basis. I have already shown how Holmes's truncated version of Austinian positivism is in substance Hobbesian positivism with a pseudo-normative basis. I will now show how the
same is true of Schmitt.
III. HOBBESIAN LEGAL POSTImSM

By 1938, Schmitt had fallen out of favor with the Nazis, as
he was outmaneuvered by Nazi hacks in his bid to become the
chief legal philosopher of the Third Reich. But besides the
dirty facts of political life in Nazi Germany, there was the fact
that even at his most obsequious, Schmitt could not bring his
vision of law completely into line with Nazi ideology. Simply
put, he still maintained a shred of hope for law as an autonomous element in politics, one which could stand in the way of
an all powerful state. This hope is expressed, very much between the lines, in a book he wrote in 1938 as a commentary
on Hobbes's Leviathan, in which he proclaimed himself the
twentieth century heir of Hobbes's thought."
According to Schmitt, Hobbes understood that the political
order and stability of the modern state turned on eradicating
political conflict within the state and displacing it to a matter
of external affairs. Furthermore, Hobbes realized that such
order had to be maintained by a system of positive law founded
on the myth of the great biblical monster, Leviathan. However,
Schmitt argues that that myth cannot survive Hobbes's attempts to provide in addition a rational justification for politi-

a theological image found in Paul's Second Letter to the Thessalonians:
The mystery of lawlessness doth already work: only there is one that
restraineth now, until he be taken out of the way; and shall be revealed
the lawless one, whom the Lord Jesus will slay with the breath of his
mouth, and bring to nought with the manifestation of his coming.

Perry Anderson, The IntransigentRight at the End of the Century, 7 LONDON REV.
BOOKS 7, 11 (1992). The point of law, that is, is to keep the dangers of lawlessness at bay-to fill the void with something certain and stable, something animated by a secular myth which can take the place that the images of the divine used
to offer in anchoring political order.
15 CARL ScHmTT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES:
MEANING AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL (George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein
trans., Greenwood Books 1996) (1938).
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cal and legal order. In each place that Hobbes appeals to or
makes room for individual reason, he subverts his own project.
Hence, Schmitt concludes that a deeply anti-individualist or
anti-liberal myth is required. Those who do not fit a particular
myth's criteria for inclusion should expect no protection from
the state.
Schmitt is still drawn to the limited protections that
Hobbes offers the individual within the state, especially
Hobbes's attempt to build into the very idea of law a prohibition against retroactive law and the maxim nulla poena sine
lege. It is in Schmitt's emphasis on both these protections and
Hobbes's overarching aim of providing the individual with
security and protection in return for obedience, that his critique of Nazism is hidden. But these protections make sense
only from the perspective of one who, like Hobbes, begins the
inquiry with a rational basis for legal order. Since Schmitt
rejects just such a basis, because in his view it undermines
order, his lament for the protection of the law is pathetic. His
elevation of stability and certainty into the exclusive values of
legal order leaves him with no basis for criticizing the order
which the Nazis constructed.6
Hobbes creates a problematic political and legal theory, in
that his positivist legal order is one which is supposed to preempt individuals from having public recourse to criticism of
the sovereign. Individuals are supposed to act as if the moral
law is contained in the civil law proclaimed by the sovereign.
However, Hobbes himself cannot follow through on this requirement. Schmitt's and Holmes's solution is to rid the law of
its inherently moral traits, while retaining hope for law which
depends on retaining those traits.
There is, fortunately, a much better solution which is to
construct a fully normative, and hence anti-positivist, theory of
law. Every constructive theory of law requires an explicit normative basis, and that basis must be reflected within the structure of the legal order to which it gives rise.' In the An-

" I deal with these themes in David Dyzenhaus, 'Now the Machine Runs Itself': Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and Kelsen, 16 CARDoZo L. REV. 1 (1994) and, more
extensively, in DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGrrIACY, supra note 61.
The point about the importance of unifying one's legal theory with a normative theory is well made by Henry MI. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1951), responding to a defense of Holmes's positivism
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glo-American world, American legal philosophers have been
preeminent in this undertaking,68 but they have not found
their inspiration in Holmes's The Path of the Law.

by Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV.
529 (1951).
" Lon L. Fuller and Ronald Dworkin are the obvious examples. Dworkin's
more recent work exhibits, however, some positivistic traits. See DWORKIN, supra
note 45, at 214. (I discuss the tensions in his work in David Dyzenhaus, Pornography and Public Reason, 7 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 261 (1994). These traits
are, in my opinion, part and parcel of the recent trend in North American liberalism to adopt a defensive stance in reaction to fundamental challenge from the
right wing of politics, a trend most strikingly exemplified in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). The trend amounts to a retreat from giving full justifications for one's political commitments to a claim that these commitments are just
what we already have achieved consensus on, something evidenced in their expression in the positive facts of our constitutional law. I discuss these issues in detail
in David Dyzenhaus, Liberalism After the Fall: Schmitt, Rawls, and the Problem of
Justification, 22 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 9 (1996) and in David Dyzenhaus, Conscience and the Law: Liberal and DemocraticApproaches, in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY
AND CONSCIENCE (forthcoming 1997). It is this trend which, I think, explains the
recent resurgence of interest in legal positivism in the United States of America.
Further, in response to John Goldberg's critique of my arguments in his contribution to this volume, I venture that his account of Holmes's attachment to
principles of political justice supports rather than undermines my arguments. If all
there is to such principles is that they are "necessities" which are "felt" by the
people, see John C.P. Goldberg, Style and Skepticism in The Path of the Law, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 225, 276-77 (1997), then it becomes a purely contingent matter
what the content of those feelings are. Holmes's account of political morality becomes anthropological, in the sense which Ronald Dworkin used to describe Lord
Devlin's account of morality. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberty and Moralism, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240, 253 (1977) (discussing PATRICK DEvLiN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MOALS (1965)). The account becomes, that is, a mere report of what the
majority of people feel is right. One needs to know then what the argument is for
enforcing such feelings. The standard response, which Dworkin adopts, is to put
this point in terms of a dilemma. Should the feelings be enforced because they are
felt or because of their content? Dworkin, of course, opts for (liberal) content. In
my own work, including the two articles last cited, I argue for a democratic theory
as the route out of the problems created by this dilemma.

